however, that this positive contribution maybe offset by an increase in the distance travelled on a network and, over time, by additional traffic induced by a highway policy (see, for example, Highways Agency, 1999; TRB, 1995) .
In this paper we wish to clarify some aspects of this relationship and, in particular, the numerical dependence of emission benefits from an investment on the elasticity of demand which governs the predicted equilibrium states of the transport system. We also briefly consider the case of capacity reduction and the change in emissions accompanying suppressed demand.
A considerable amount of research has addressed the relationship between economic (user) benefits and induced traffic (see, for example, Coombe, 1996; Highways Agency, 1997; SACTRA, 1994; Williams, 1998; Williams and Moore, 1990; Williams and Yamashita, 1992a; 1992b) . In the presence of elasticity effects, the economic benefits of a new road or capacity expansion may be less than or exceed the benefit determined under zero elasticity. In low-congestion and low-elasticity regimes, the total benefits derived from a modest change in costs may exceed the benefits derived under zero elasticity (the fixed matrix), as the utility gains to induced traffic outweigh the additional congestion imposed on existing users. In contrast, where and when the network is congested, the cross-elasticity of demand between road transport and other alternatives is moderate or high, and the scale of the investment results in a considerable reduction in user costs, induced traffic may significantly erode the benefits which would have accrued in its absence (SACTRA, 1994; Williams and Moore, 1990) .
Because the spatial and temporal extent of congestion is strongly dependent on the pattern of demand and network characteristics, the relative sizes of congestion disbenefits and the benefits to induced traffic will yield a net result which will depend on the daily profile of demand. Here we examine elasticity effects for a daily profile typical of conditions in or near urban areas.
Various simplified economic models have been proposed to examine the extent to which the presence of road pricing influences the benefits which result from new or expanded roads (see, for example, Newbery, 1990; Thomson, 1970) . Only recently has the extent of bias in the appraisal of new roads caused by unpriced congestion in the reference state been explored within a network context. Using a model with a single user and a single daily time period, Williams et al (2001b) have suggested that, in moderately and highly congested networks, the benefit from a highway investment under free use may exceed that under efficient pricing by up to 25%. This, however, will vary with context and, in particular, the elasticities of demand and supply. Here, we extend this analysis to a multiuser and multiperiod context over the lifetime of a project.
Many have interpreted the conclusions of the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA, 1994) as reducing the case for roads. However, Foster (1995) argued that substantial induced traffic might well reinforce the case for more capacity:`T he [SACTRA] Report scarcely mentions those cases where inclusion of induced traffic improves the case for more road building and for building and improving roads to a higher capacity ... . If the demand forecast for any product is revised upwards there will be a stronger case for investment to meet it ... subject to an overall cost benefit test. The valid exception is where the cost of additional capacity required is high enough to negate the return on investment ... . The adoption of road pricing would alter what is optimal'' (pages 27 and 29). On optimal capacity decisions under first-best and second-best pricing, there is a large, and predominantly US, literature dating from the period of urban freeway development in the United States. The standard economic models, which are reviewed by Small (1992) , often employ a single link or bottleneck to examine the interplay between the demand for and cost of travel (Arnott et al, 1993; d'Ouville and McDonald, 1990; Gronau, 1994; Mohring, 1965; Small et al, 1989; Vickrey, 1969; Wilson, 1983) . We shall draw on this literature and develop it, focusing specifically on the role of suppressed and induced traffic and the dependence of user benefits on the elasticity of demand. We know of no systematic analysis of optimal capacity expansion under different pricing regimes within complex road networks. This will be a further contribution of this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we draw together the notational issues and output measures, and in section 3 the highway policies are specified. In section 4 the emission characteristics from new and expanded roads are examined, and in section 5 a corresponding analysis is performed for the user benefit component. In section 6 we adopt both the single representative link (SRL) and the network model to assess the role of elasticity effects in road-capacity decisions and we address Foster's contention. In the final section we summarise the contributions of the papers and discuss the wider implications of the work.
2 Environmental and economic output measures 2.1 Environmental and economic benefit measures Our central concerns are twofold: to derive (1) the extent to which new roads or capacity changes give rise to absolute changes in emissions and user benefits, and (2) the effects of suppressed and induced trafficöelasticity effectsöon the benefits from new or expanded roads. These are suitably measured with reference to the fixed matrix (zero elasticity) limit.
In order to unify the treatment of benefits from changes in emissions and travel time, we define, for each pollutant q, environmental (emission) benefits EB q (t) in year t which result from the investment or pricing policy, relative to the reference states, as the total change in emissions over the network. This is given by the following summation over link contributions
The superscripts (1) and (2) refer to the measures in the reference and policy states, respectively, and N(1) and N(2) denote the networks before and after policy intervention. Equation (1) may refer to a specific daily time period, or be summed to relate to a 24-hour period. Using the notation and equation (4) from paper 1 (Williams et al, 2001a) , this may be written
The emission benefits accompanying a scheme may be positive or negative according to the balance of the changes in volumes, speeds, and distances travelled in the network. For the special case in which the links in the networks are common before and after capacity changes (relevant to the single representative link, SRL, and the A48 network policy discussed later), equation (2) simplifies in form to
emphasising the contributions from changes in the volume and speed on individual links. For user benefits at any given year t, we take the rule-of-a-half approximation to Hotelling's generalised surplus measure (Williams, 1976) 
In a similar way we compute the user benefits derived from an investment under road pricing
an asterisk denoting volumes and costs with the link charges in place. The second term on the right-hand side accounts for the change in revenue, which is treated as a transfer. Here, p ij (t) is the i-to-j congestion charge in the relevant daily time period in year t. The present value of benefits, PVB, is determined in the usual way by summation over the benefit stream with an appropriate discount factor d, in the United Kingdom currently taken at 6%, over the twenty-year period 2000^20,
The quantity PVB Ã is similarly defined in terms of summation over the investment benefits B Ã (t) under the pricing policy.
Elasticity effects and environmental and economic benefits
In order to assess the implications of elasticity effects on the above measures of economic and environmental benefit we determine their proportional difference from those corresponding values computed under a demand elasticity, e 0. That is, we define quantities D UB and D EB , relating to user and emission benefits, respectively, as follows
which, by construction, vanish for`fixed-matrix' (e 0) calculations. This relationship between benefit values under zero and nonzero elasticities may also be expressed as
PVBe PVBe 01 À D UB e, and EB q t, e EB q t, 01 À D EB t, e . (8) We also define the quantity s(e, t), which measures the extent to which the value of an investment is reduced or enhanced by the presence of congestion pricing, relative to the unpriced (free-use) system
Measures (7) and (9) may refer either to a specific time of day or be aggregated over a daily profile. Again, on rearrangement PVB Ã e PVBe1 À s UB e, and EB
The quantity D Ã (e) may be used to measure the elasticity effects of a network change with respect to an optimally charged system
From the definitions (7), (9), and (11), the indices D Ã (e), D(e), and s(e) are related by the expression
For the single representative link, but not the network, the value of the user benefit PVB at elasticity e 0 will be equal to that under road pricing PVB Ã , and equation (12) For low elasticities, the final term will usually be of second order. Equations (12) and (13) thus relate the effect of suppressed and induced traffic on user benefits (or emissions) under congestion pricing.
Specification of the policies
In the following numerical simulations we examine the effects of capacity and network changes within the single representative link SRL and the network models. For the SRL model, a policy is identified by a change in the free-flow speed and the (uniform) link capacity. Both discrete and continuous changes in these quantities are considered.
In figure 1 (see over) we depict the base network and three hypothetical highway policies which will be evaluated with the network model. These consist of: a dual bypass, the M4, to the north of the city; a new river crossing with additional link expansion (CRL) in a congested part of the city; and capacity expansion on several links along an internal route, the A48.
These policies were chosen to provide different orders of investment and a varying spatial disposition with respect to current and predicted congestion in a city. In addition to these three discrete network changes, we consider the expansion (and contraction) of the A48 east^west route capacity, taken as a continuous variable.
Each of these policies will be examined under the two pricing regimes considered in paper 1 to form an investment^pricing combination. Thus, under free use the policy is evaluated without and with the network change in place. Similarly, under congestion pricing, the network is optimally charged in each daily time period and year over the period 2000^20 both without and with the link modifications in place. As we noted in paper 1, the emission benefits (or disbenefits) arising from a road investment in any year t are attributed to some or all of the following: the change in average speed on individual links, the change in the volume of travel by class of vehicle, the change in distance travelled in the new network configuration. When comparing differences in the benefits associated with differences in elasticities (for example, comparing emission benefits at e À0X25 with those at e 0) all three sources may contribute, but we would expect the first two to dominate. In particular, in any future year we would expect that the demand and congestion will decline as the numerical value of the elasticity increases (because of suppression), so that the investment benefit from the reduction of congestion and pollution will be less than that under the fixed matrix.
We examine first the absolute contribution of the policies to the total network emissions and then look in more detail at elasticity effects relative to the reference states. Once more, we take the behaviour of carbon monoxide to be broadly indicative of the temporal evolution of the pollutants carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, and particulates. Table 1 (see over) sets out the peak-hour carbon monoxide emissions and emission benefits arising from the three road policies as determined in 2000, the opening year, and 2010, the mid-point year. Introduction of the northern bypass (M4) results in a major difference to the total peak-hour emissions in both years, under the fixed-matrix assumption reducing the emissions of carbon monoxide to 60% of the base value at 2000. Expansion of the A48, the major through route, also makes a significant contribution, with the corresponding total reduction in peak emissions amounting to 13%. The CRL has a small (3%) impact on the total peak hour carbon monoxide emissions.
The elasticity effects of suppressed and induced traffic on environmental benefits are examined through the quantity D EB (t, e) defined in equation (7). At the base year 2000, for all cases, the peak-hour emissions increase under an increase in elasticity because of the contribution from induced traffic. Relative to the hourly peak base value of 1028 kg, the benefit associated with lower emissions reduces as the elasticity rises, yielding positive and increasing values of D(e). Table 1 indicates that the peak-hour D values are moderately significant, and at e À0X25 reduce the emission benefits from the M4 by 13% in year 2000, compared with the e 0 estimate. For the CRL, the large erosion of emission benefits (30%) must be seen in the context of a very modest total contribution from the policy. At the higher elasticity value e À0X5 these results are approximately doubled, but may be subjected to upward bias.
In year 2010, with the policies in place, there is a qualitative difference in the direction of change for the total emissions as elasticity increases. For the M4 the total emissions increase with increasing elasticity. For the CRL and A48 policies the total emissions decrease with increasing elasticity. This behaviour is explained by the relative strength of the induction and speed-change effects of a policy in relation to the (common) suppression effect in the reference equilibrium state. Recall that, in year 2010, (see table 1 and paper 1), the total emissions in the reference state reduce as elasticity increases because of trip suppression. For the large M4 scheme, the associated induction effect is much stronger than for the other two policies and the emissions rise with the increase in trips.
At any year t, the interpretation of emission benefits must be made relative to the reference state (without the scheme) in that year. The benefits for the three policies, which are positive in all cases, decrease as elasticity rises, resulting in positive values of D(t). For the M4 bypass the value of D(2010) approaches 30% for the default elasticity of À0.25. The corresponding values for the other policies are even larger. Recall that this is the error which would be incurred if the emission benefits were measured using a fixed-matrix rather than a demand model with an elasticity of À0.25.
The effect of network policies on emissions under congestion pricing
The introduction of a highway policy under a regime of road pricing will, through its effect on congestion, cause the link prices to fall compared with those in the priced reference state, although exceptions may arise on some individual links according to the nature of the policy. The mean prices, for each policy in the base year, determined by dividing the total network revenue by total trips, are shown in table 2. The default elasticity of e À0X25 has been taken. These prices should be compared with those given in the charged reference network (table 7 in paper 1). It can be seen that only for the large M4 bypass scheme is there a substantial price change, because of the correspondingly large reduction in network congestion, particularly in the peak period.
In table 3 we present the total peak hour carbon monoxide emissions and the associated benefits for the three policies when the network is subject to optimal congestion charges in year 2000. In this pricing regime the absolute level of emissions and the emission benefits from the policies are considerably reduced relative to those computed in the unpriced network. The influence of pricing on the investment value, measured by s EB (e), varies with context and, at the default elasticity, is highly significant, taking values of 33% (for the CRL), 48% (for the M4) and approaches 60% (for the A48). At the higher level of elasticity (e À0X5) the corresponding values are 46%, 67%, and 83%, respectively. As we continue to emphasise, the latter set may be subject to upward bias. The respective values in year 2010, given in table 4, are marginally higher in all elasticity ranges, reflecting the`flattening' of the emissiont ime characteristics over the life of the project under congestion charging. These results indicate that, through the effect of charges on the levels of congestion, the emission benefit derived from an investment under road pricing may be considerably less than that determined under free use.
In paper 1 we drew attention to the dominance of the off-peak period in the production of emissions and its particular significance for carbon dioxide emissions. In table 5 we show the contribution of the M4 scheme to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the daily time periods both under free use and under road pricing. Under free use the benefits from emission reduction in the off-peak period are over twice as significant as the contribution in the peak. The values of D 24 and s 24 again show the potentially large implications of elasticity effects in eroding benefits, and the contribution of congestion pricing, respectively. 
Emissions under continual capacity expansion
To assess the effect of capacity changes further we have subjected eight of the links on the A48 scheme to a continuous change in capacity between their base value of 2400 and 3900 pcu h À1 (pcu are passenger car unit equivalents), and have examined the total peak-hour carbon monoxide emissions as a function of the capacity increment. We have also considered a contraction of capacity from 2400 to 2100 pcu h À1 to explore the effect of congestion increases on suppression and its implications for emission generation.
The peak-hour carbon monoxide emissions at year 2000 are shown under a capacity expansion up to 1500 pcu h À1 for both free-use [figure 2(a)] and congestionpricing [figure 2(b)] regimes. As capacity rises, congestion reduces and emissions reduce accordingly at a decreasing rate. Although the reduction in total emissions is modest, elasticity effects on emission benefits can be substantial. Thus, under a demand elasticity of À0.25, and free-use conditions, the emission benefit from an expansion of 1500 pcu h À1 from the base value of 2400 pcu h À1 is 22% less than that under a fixed-matrix assumption. Under congestion pricing [figure 2(b)] the main effect is the removal of demand itself, with the emissions associated with an elasticity of À0.25 being significantly reduced from its unpriced level [s(e À0X25, t 2000) 60% along the length of the curve]. As the elasticity increases, the`flatter' relationship with capacity increment arise as the lower congestion charge under capacity increases compensates for the effects of induced traffic and reduced congestion.
5 Road investment, elasticity effects, and the erosion of user benefits 5.1 User benefit erosion in a network under free use
In table 6 (over) we record the user benefits accruing from each policy under free use in the various daily time periods, for different values of the elasticity of demand. For all policies the benefits in the peak (1.4 hours) and the off-peak (11.4 hours) periods reduce as the elasticity increases, indicating that congestion is playing a significant part in these periods over the lifetime of a project, and that the benefit to any induced traffic is being dominated by the negative contribution of its effects on existing users. The nighttime (11.5 hours) benefit, always small, shows a slight increase with elasticity as induced traffic enters an uncongested network. (The very small nighttime benefits from the expansion of the A48 is a consequence of the free-flow speed being independent of capacity for the policy considered.) Over all policies it will be noted that the benefit of the long off-peak period is comparable with and greater than that of the more congested but much shorter peak period. The contribution of elasticity effects to the total user benefit, as measured by D 24 (e) is strongly policy dependent. At the default elasticity D takes values of just 10% for the M4, 16% for the CRL, and 20% for the A48. It is interesting to note that, at an elasticity of À0.5, the erosion index is only 16% for the lightly congested M4 scheme, but approaches a quarter (CRL) to a third (A48 expansion) of the fixed-matrix benefits, for those highway policies subject to congestion in the body of the city.
Road investment benefits under congestion pricing
We have elsewhere examined the effect of road pricing in networks of differing complexity for a homogeneous group of users during a single daily time period, and determined the value of s, the extent to which the benefit of a policy under free use exceeds (or possibly is less than) that under marginal cost pricing (Williams et al, 2001b) . The single-period analysis has shown that for relatively congested networks the value of s will usually be positive but may become negative under very high elasticities or where`boundary conditions' are encountered (see the above reference for more details). In this section we extend this analysis by considering investment appraisal with a daily demand profile typical of urban travel [figure 3(a) in paper 1].
When subject to road pricing the user benefits of policies are, in all cases, less than those determined under free use. For the M4 and A48 policies there is an increasing trend as elasticity increases, while the CRL policy variation is somewhat more erratic. We have discussed similar trends before in the context of a simpler model (Williams et al, 2001b) . For e À0X25, the numerical differences between the benefits under free use and congestion pricing are not large for the M4 (12%) and CRL (6%), but are considerable for the expansion of the A48 (25%). This may be attributable to the ready availability of route substitutes for the former road schemes (the A48 itself), and the lack of a close cross-town substitute for the A48 policy (see figure 1) . 6 Do elasticity effects improve or reduce the case for building roads to a higher capacity?
Introduction
The above discussion has, for the policies examined, reinforced the SACTRA (1994) conclusions that a fixed-matrix assumption (e 0) may significantly overstate the total user benefits which would be obtained from the assumption of a more elastic travel market. This does not, however, tell us anything about the optimal capacity (1) of these policies, or how such capacities vary with elasticity of demand. From an efficiency perspective, it may be that a higher capacity of the road would be justified under both zero and nonzero elasticities of demand. As noted above, Foster's (1995) expressed concern was that the SACTRA analysis should be cast within the wider framework of optimal capacity decisions under free use and road pricing. To address these issues we ask the following questions:
(1) For unpriced congestion, is the optimal capacity of a policy, determined under a fixedmatrix (e 0) assumption, greater or less than that determined for nonzero elasticities? (2) Does the optimal capacity under free use exceed that under congestion charging on the network? Although it will not be possible to derive optimal capacities for specific investment cases without a detailed knowledge of the capacity cost function, some progress may be made by considering the variation of the user benefits under changing capacity.
We consider first the case of the single representative link (SRL) before treating investment within a network.
Expectations from solution of the single representative link model
The optimality conditions for the single link call for the price to equal the marginal social cost of a journey and for capacity to be expanded until the marginal saving of costs to travellers equals the marginal cost of capacity (see, for example, Small, 1992) . Much of the literature on optimal capacity has considered whether the second-best solution (and, in particular, optimality under free use) is larger or smaller than the first-best solution (that under marginal cost pricing). Simplified single-link models have been used to show that the outcome depends on the relative size of`demand' (essentially elasticity effects) and`cost' effects (formally the marginal rate of substitution, x, between travel time and capacity) of the congestion toll. Wilson (1983) showed that for any suboptimal toll the second-best capacity is larger than the first best if the elasticity of demand is less than the ratio of the consumer price of travel to the private congestion cost. D 'Ouville and McDonald (1990) extended this analysis to show that if the elasticity of demand and the parameter x are both less than unity then an increase in toll from zero may allow a reduction in capacity.
In order to focus on the role played by suppressed and induced traffic, we undertook a numerical analysis of the three-daily-period SRL model described in paper 1 and explored the implications for optimal capacity of an increase in elasticity above a value of zero. Results are presented in figure 3 (see over) for the variation of marginal user benefit MB(e, k) as a function of capacity increment k for demand elasticity values between 0 and À0X5, under free use.
Associated with the policy of expansion are two forms of link time^volume relation. In the first, SF1, the free-flow speed is dependent on capacity whereas for the second, SF2, the free-flow speed remains constant as capacity changes. To derive SF1, we have taken standard COBA curves (Highways Agency, 1996) and interpolated the free-flow speed from curves corresponding to different road types. The speed^flow (1) Throughout this section we use the term`optimal' in the restricted sense of maximising net benefits to users. curve SF2 would be more appropriate in a context where there was a fixed speed limit in the urban area.
Any increment in capacity will lower user costs and increase the demand for travel on the link through the presence of induced traffic. As congestion reduces, the incremental benefit from capacity expansion reduces and all curves exhibit a declining slope. The relative contribution of the benefits from reduced congestion to existing travellers and the direct benefits to induced traffic will vary along the curve.
The results for SF1, depicted in figure 3(a), show that there is a capacity increment at which the marginal benefit curve, MB(e 0, k), for an elasticity equal to zero crosses that for the higher elasticity values, MB(jej b 0, k). The benefit increment under a demand elasticity equal to zero may therefore be less than or greater than that for nonzero elasticity. Although the three curves, corresponding to e 0, À0X25, À0X5, appear to cross at a single capacity increment, k (e) (approximately 600 pcu h À1 ), this is thought to be a coincidence. This`cross-over' occurs because of the increasing importance of the induced component to the benefit of a capacity increment relative to congestion relief when the free-flow speed increases. However, for the case of SF2, shown in figure 3(b) , no such free-flow speed increase occurs and, for the range of elasticities and capacity increments examined, there is no`cross-over', Thus, for SF1, two capacity regimes are defined: regime 1: k`k for which MBk, e`MBk, e 0, regime 2: k b k for which MBk, e b MBk, e 0. We shall assume that the marginal cost of capacity MKK(k) cuts the marginal user benefit curve MB(k, e) from below (except where the marginal cost of capacity is sufficiently high for economic or environmental reasons that a boundary solution exists and the optimal state is the current one). A detailed discussion of capacity cost functions can be found in Small (1992) .
We identify the (optimal) capacity at which the marginal cost curve MKK(k) cuts the marginal benefit curve MB(k, e) as k Ã (e), and shall denote the optimal capacity when the elasticity is zero k Ã (e 0) to be k 0 . Depending on the detailed forms of the marginal cost and benefit functions, two possibilities exist: (a) If k 0 falls in regime 1, for which MB(k, e 0) b MB(k, e), then k 0 will overstate the optimal capacity k Ã (e) corresponding to a nonzero elasticity. (b) The converse is true if k 0 falls in regime 2, for which MB(k, e 0)`MB(k, e). The optimal investment derived from inelastic demand (e 0) may thus overestimate or underestimate the optimal capacity under a nonzero elasticity, and Foster's contention is only valid when k 0 falls in regime 2. For the speed^flow curve SF2 no free-flow speed differential exists and, as elasticity increases, the marginal benefit curves do not cross over the capacity range. In this case the whole capacity range is associated with regime 1 for which MB(k, e)`MB(k, e 0), and k 0 will always be greater than the optimal capacity under nonzero elasticity. Under these conditions, Foster's contention is not valid.
Capacity expansion in a network under free use and congestion charging
We now turn to the network context and, as in section 4.3, consider the expansion of the A48 in which capacity is treated as a continuous variable. As Small (1992) notes, given the design possibilities of roads and associated junctions, the actual possibilities for increases in capacity may be closer to continuous rather than discrete, despite a division of roads into lanes. Again two cases are considered. In the first there is no variation of free-flow speed with capacity increment for the eight relevant links, and in the second an incremental free-flow speed of 1 km h À1 is introduced for every 300 pcu h À1 of extra capacity added. In figure 4 (a) we show the variation of marginal 24-hour benefit with capacity increment for the case in which there is no variation in free-flow speed with capacity (which might occur in the body of a city subject to speed restrictions). This variation is shown at different values of the elasticity. The corresponding variation under congestion charging is shown in figure 4(b) . The salient features of these figures are as follows: 1. For all elasticities in the range 0 to À0.5, the marginal benefit decreases, at a decreasing rate, as capacity increases. 2. For a given capacity increment, the marginal benefit decreases as the numerical value of the elasticity of demand increases. There is no capacity for which the marginal benefit curve for e 0 crosses that for nonzero elasticity. 3. For any value of the elasticity, including that for e 0, the value of the marginal benefit for any capacity increment is greater under free use than that under congestion charging. For marginal cost curves MKK(k) cutting the marginal benefit curves MB(e,k) from below, these conditions imply the following: (a) Over the whole range of capacities, elasticity effects decrease the benefit from a given capacity change and the optimal capacity derived under zero elasticity will exceed that derived under a nonzero value of elasticity. (b) The optimal capacity under road pricing will be less than that under free use. We have repeated the numerical analysis for the case in which the free-flow speed on the expanded links is a function of capacity with the expectation that as elasticities increase the curve MB(e 0, k) would cross the curve MB(e b 0, k. In contrast to the single link case, this did not occur for elasticities up to e À0X5 in the range of capacities considered. We attribute this to the existence of network effects. Capacity expansion in the body of the city will, in the above capacity range, always serve as a source of congestion relief which will prevent the domination by elasticity effects. In this case, too, conditions (a) and (b) hold and Foster's contention is not valid.
Discussion and conclusion
In these papers we have sought to extend the concerns of the SACTRA (1994) report and responses to it, and address some unresolved problems relating to the significance of elasticity effects. These issues have been examined under different pricing regimes, namely free use and marginal cost (congestion) charging on all links.
With regard to elasticity effects, we have sought to place the treatment of emission and user benefits on the same footing. We have thereby confirmed analytically and numerically that the conclusions of the SACTRA report (1994) relating to the effect of induced traffic on user benefits may be extended to the case of emissions. In particular, in congested conditions in road transport markets exhibiting significant demand response, elasticity effects may undermine the benefits from new and expanded roads to a considerable degree. Although scheme and time dependent, D(e) for emissionsöthe proportional difference between emission benefits under a`fixed matrix' or zero elasticity assumption and the corresponding value at elasticity eömay attain values of up to 20%, for rather modest values of elasticity. This must, however, be seen in the context of the absolute change in emissions which for some local schemes may be small.
In both user and emission benefit assessments we have drawn attention to the distribution of benefits over a daily profile and have noted, in particular, the substantial contribution from the off-peak period. If this period is close to capacity or likely to become congested for a significant portion of the life of the scheme then its contribution is likely to exceed that of the more congested but much shorter peak period. (2) We have noted that the relationship between erosion and elasticity effects is rather similar for both user and emission benefits. In particular, the functional dependence of erosion on the demand elasticity, expressed through D(e), is comparable (approximately linear at small values of e), although the absolute erosion measure for emissions is always greater than that for user benefits. We offer the following explanation.
In the appendix we have derived, for a single representative link, the emission and user benefits accompanying an investment under local linearisation of the demand and cost functions. Expressions for the erosion of benefits in the base year 2000 takes the following forms, with E d denoting the numerical value of the elasticity of demand
A full interpretation of the terms is given in the appendix. There are important similarities and differences between these two expressions. The similar dependence on the demand and cost elasticities (the first term outside the square brackets) relates to the common quantity of induced traffic. This expression rises linearly when the demand elasticity is small and then to a lower power as E d increases. This behaviour is observed in our numerical tests on networks. The important difference relates to the signs of the effects which undermine the benefit which would be obtained under a zero demand elasticity.
The user benefit index, D UB (e) is the outcome of two mechanisms: the positive contribution of benefit to new users of the highway system, and the negative effect that induced traffic has on existing travellers who experience less of a speed change than they would otherwise achieve. For user benefits the erosion effects will be positive only when the externality effects of the induced traffic dominate the utility gains which new travellers receive. D UB can become negative in low-congestion, high-elasticity regimes (Williams and Moore, 1990 ). In the case of emissions, however, the induced traffic is responsible (in the above formula) for two negative contributions to the total benefit: the emissions which are directly generated from additional travellers, and the indirect externality effect which they impose on othersöless emission gains are obtained from a smaller speed change than otherwise would have been enjoyed by existing users. Although these components relate to a simplified representation of the transport system, they are also manifested with common elasticity parameters on each origin^destination pair in a network context. An explanation for the functional dependence and the relative sizes of the erosion effects is thus provided. The conceptual, analytical, and numerical basis for an extension of the SACTRA conclusions to include emissions is now evident.
In paper 1 we noted that the adoption of aggregate elasticity demand models could result in an upward bias in the results because of the failure to include certain systems effects associated with type-B responses. We believe that for the default elasticity (e À0X25) the results derived are entirely defensible, but that those results corresponding to an elasticity of À0X5 (or higher) may be subject to significant upward bias, requiring a more explicit consideration of the systems effects. If, however, a different default value for the elasticity were deemed appropriate, the D values should be interpolated within the relevant range 0`jej`0X5.
A second major theme of our work has concerned the evaluation of investments under different pricing regimes. We have shown that, first, congestion pricing is a very effective way of controlling emissions, and, second, that the user benefit derived from a scheme under efficient charging may be considerably less than that under free use. With respect to user benefits, we have thus demonstrated that unpriced road schemes may have a bias in their favour of between 5% and 25% compared with an efficiently priced system. Again, this result is strongly dependent on context. In summary, the efficiency and environmental justification for a road investment can, in certain contexts, be significantly reduced by invoking marginal cost pricing on network links. It remains to assess the corresponding implications for investment benefits in relation to alternative pricing systems on urban cordons (see, for example, the pricing configurations adopted by May and Milne, 2000) .
Finally, we have examined the wider issues of optimal investment under different pricing regimes. In order to assess whether elasticity effects increase or diminish the case for building roads to a higher capacity we have used both the single representative link and the network models in conjunction with a continuous change in the capacity of a road scheme. The detailed response to this important question depends both on the nature of the design (speed^volume) characteristics and on the marginal cost of capacity for the new or expanded road. We have examined conditions on a single representative link under which elasticity effects can be found to increase the case for capacity expansion, relative to the fixed-matrix case. However, for the network policies considered, in the range of elasticities selected, the presence of induced traffic reduces the case for building roads to a higher capacity.
In a general remark in support of his contention, Foster (1995) notes that increases in the demand for a goodöinduced trafficöwill tend to increase the case for an investment to meet it. However, in typical cases of road development particularly in or near urban areas, we have found that this effect is negated by the effects of the changes in the user costs resulting from that increase in demand. Although we do not rule out the possibility of elasticity effects increasing the optimal capacity of a scheme within a network, above that determined from a zero elasticity assumption, the numerical studies suggest that this is unlikely in practice. For elasticities in the range 0 to À0X5, the presence of road pricing will reduce the optimal capacity of a new or expanded road.
One major development in the United Kingdom since the publication of the SACTRA (1994) report, particularly relevant to urban areas, is that the range of options and the associated efficiency calculations increasingly relate to passenger movements as a whole.`Optimal' capacity considerations are appropriately extended to road-space allocation between competing modal users under multiple economic and environmental objectives. Our analysis gives some support to those who argue that the disbenefit to existing road users from capacity reallocation will be moderated by suppressed traffic. We have shown that the peak-hour emission disbenefit from such policies, determined under free use will, in congested conditions, be significantly less than that associated with route switching alone. Both standard theory and the numerical tests suggest that it would be more effective and efficient to implement any such changes in conjunction with congestion charges.
None of our remarks should be interpreted as being against the consideration of building roads or expanding capacities when the best alternative environmental options have been explored. However, in principle, the justification for such investments should not be made solely on the basis of a`do-nothing' reference policy, but in relation to efficiently priced systems. If congestion pricing is not politically or operationally feasible, the extent of the bias towards investment implicit in adopting an unpriced reference network should be clearly stated.
In these papers we have presented the systematic variations implicit in a given model form applied to a small city. This model may be embellished in many ways, both in the specification of the demand and cost functions, and in the determination of emissions. We note, in particular, the scope for improving the network demand model by incorporating a range of responses, especially temporal cross-substitution of demand in association with higher peak-hour elasticities, within an equilibrium framework. There is similar scope for refinement of the supply-side model which would allow a more accurate representation of marginal costs in the regime above capacity. Both these issues are currently under active research. We believe, however, that our substantive conclusions are robust with respect to improved specification of the models, and are widely applicable to general networks. increase in speed (s 3 À s 2 (the second term in the brackets). Above the speed s Ã , the second term in equation (A13) will be negativeöthe induced traffic results in a speed reduction which will lower emissions.
The above analysis may be extended in many ways at the expense of an increase in complexity. However, the network tests presented above provide a more general numerical analysis.
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